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Land leasing is a major source of the land input to production agriculture. 
Responses from a survey of landlords leasing crop land in Arkansas are analyzed to 
better understand those factors motivating landlords in the type of lease they select 
and the terms of those leases. Probit models are estimated to determine the relative 
importance of variables representing credit constraint, agency problem, and risk 
aversion factors. Regression models then estimate the impact of site, landlord, and 
tenant characteristics on contract terms – the percentage of crop and cost sharing 
arrangements between landlord and tenant. Probit results suggest credit constraint 
factors influence lease-type selection. Risk aversion, managerial ability, and social 
capital factors are also supported. Regression models show that land and crop 
characteristics are significant determinants of contract terms. 
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Introduction 
 
Land leasing plays a significant role in providing the land input to U.S. production 
agriculture. Leased land accounts for 40% of total farm acreage (USDA/NASS, 
1999a) and approximately 35% of farm assets (estimated by authors). Leasing 
allows farm operators to control more acreage with less equity, carries lower 
financial risk, and allows for greater managerial flexibility than purchasing land 
with debt financing. Aside from inheritance, leasing is the primary method by 
which family farms are able to control sufficient acreage to be commercially viable. 
Over two-thirds of leased land is found on farms with 1,000 or more operating acres 
(USDA/NASS, 1999a). 
 
The small volume of U.S. land leasing literature (see Dasgupta et al., 1999, and 
Allen and Lueck, 1995) does not reflect its importance in U.S. agriculture. In 
particular, there is a paucity of literature explaining and modeling the behavior of 
the contracting parties at the lease-level. As noted by Bierlen and Parsch (1996), 
this is likely due to a lack of good lease-level data. Lease-level data are difficult to 
collect because lease agreements are determined by private negotiation between 
tenants and landlords in localized markets, which are often unique. Tenants and 
landlords are often unwilling to release proprietary information and data collecting 
agencies may be reluctant to use up goodwill with producers and landlords to collect 
lease data. A better understanding of empirical landlord-tenant contracts is 
required for managerial and policy decisions. The analysis from the present study 
addresses this issue by relying on primary data from Arkansas landlords.   
 
Contract type (cash rent and various share arrangements) substantially affects 
tenant/landlord sharing of revenue, costs, risk, and managerial responsibilities. 
Because of this, researchers have examined factors motivating cropland contract 
choice selection based on farm operator/landlord incentives in each contract type. 
Existing U.S. research, see e.g., Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993), Bierlen et al. (2000a), 
Gwilliam (1993), and Brown and Atkinson (1981), test for and find evidence 
consistent with hypotheses deriving from the agency problem, tenant/landlord risk 
sharing, social capital, tenant managerial ability, the agricultural ladder, and 
tenant credit constraints. However, except for Bierlen, Parsch and Dixon (BPD) 
(1999), the literature focuses on the selection of contract type while ignoring the 
contract terms.  
 
Farm operators need to understand landlord motivation in selecting lease type to be 
better able to negotiate with landlords.  Also, by understanding what motivates 
other landlords, lessors can better understand the land market and their place in it. 
This paper estimates cropland contract decision-making models with data from 
owners of Arkansas cropland. The study follows the approach applied in BPD by 
examining both contract choice and selection of contract terms. While the BPD 
study examined factors affecting tenant decisions, the present study provides R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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information on leasing arrangements from the landlord’s perspective. There are no 
investigations to our knowledge that solely examine landlord selection of cropland 
contract type and the terms thereof. Therefore, this study provides information on 
the incentives – financing, risk, and cost – motivating landlords to provide this vital 




In late fall 1998 a survey of 706 landlords who had leases in five Arkansas crop-
reporting districts (3, 4, 5, 6 and 9) was administered. These districts are located in 
the Mississippi Delta of Arkansas (the eastern third of state) and along the 
Arkansas River Valley in the west-central part of the state. The two regions include 
almost all of the state’s cropland operations.  
 
The sampling frame did not include a complete listing of all landlords since such 
information is difficult, if not impossible to obtain. The sampling frame relied on 
information available from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) 
gathered from the 1997 Census of Agriculture. Of the 706 sampled cropland owners, 
199 usable questionnaires were returned. This study only includes landlords who 
leased cropland for rice, soybean or cotton production and who personally farmed 
fewer than 80 acres – non-operator landlords. Because of different information sets 
between operators and non-operators, we wanted to exclude operator landlords who 
farmed cropland in addition to being lessors. 
 
The landlords were queried about their largest rice, full-season soybean or cotton 
leases for 1998 cropping arrangements. Thus, each landlord gave information on at 
most one lease for each of these crops as requested by the survey instrument. Model 
variable definitions utilized from the survey are reported in Table 1.  
1 
Summary statistics for the variables utilized are reported in Table 2. Landlord age 
ranged from 34 to 93, but the average landlord age of 64 shows that landlords are of 
retirement age or close to it. USDA’s 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land 
Ownership survey (AELOS) and Johnson et al. (1988) report similar numbers for 
landlord age. The average tenant age as given by the landlords was 47 ranging from 
23 to 80.2 More than 75% of the respondents were over the age 55 and the landlords 
were typically males representing 79% of the respondents. Landlord respondents 
were well educated with almost 90% of landlords having finished high school, 65% 
having pursued post-secondary education, and 42% were college graduates. 
Compared with the earlier 1997 tenant survey (BPD), the landlords had more 
formal education than did the responding tenants. Bierlen et al. (2000a) report that  
 
                                                           
1  
2 Results of a similar 1997 tenant survey reported 50.7 years for the median tenant age (Bierlen et 
al., 2000a). R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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Table 1: Model Variable Definitions, Arkansas landlord survey, 1998. 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables 
CONTRACT  0 if cash rent contract; 1 if crop-share contract; 2 if cost-share contract. 
RENT  Cash rent ($/acre) if CONTRACT = 0. 
CROPCROP  Landlord’s share (%) of crop if CONTRACT = 1. 
CROPCOST  Landlord’s share (%) of crop if CONTRACT = 2. 
COSTCOST  Landlord’s share (%) of operating expenses if CONTRACT = 2. 
Explanatory Variables 
EQUITY  Ratio of tenant owned to operated acres. 
VALUE  Total value ($1,000) of the cropland that landlord owns and leases to others: 1 if 
under 100; 2 if 100-249; 3 if 250-499; 4 if 500-999; and 5 if 1,000 and above. 
START  1 if landlord purchased all or part of leased parcel; 0 otherwise. 
YEARS  Number of years parcel has been leased to current tenant. 
INCOME  Percent of landlord income from leasing:  1 if less than 25%; 2 if between  
25-49%; 3 if between 50-75%; and 4 if greater than 75%. 
IRRIGATE  1 if leased parcel is irrigated, 0 otherwise. 
QUALITY  1988-97 county average soybean yield (bu./acre). 
SUPPLY  Ratio of 1997 contracted acres in county to number of operators in county. 
VARIANCE  1988-1997 county yield coefficient of variation for pertinent crop. 
OUTLAY  1 if tenant has a desire to reduce cash expenses, 0 otherwise. 
KNOW  Landlord knowledge of current agricultural prices and production methods relative 
to tenant: 1 if less than; 2 if equal to; 3 if more than (landlord’s opinion). 
DENSITY  1998 county population per square mile. 
ACRES  Number of acres in leased parcel. 
RELATIVE  Social closeness of the contracting parties:  0 if stranger or institution; 1 if 
acquaintance; 2 if close friend; 3 if relative. 
LLAGE  Age of landlord in years. 
TENAGE  Age of tenant in years. 
BILL  Landlord perception of who benefited most from FAIR’s passage:  1 if more 
advantage to tenant; 2 if no change or opinion; 3 if more advantage to landlord. 
RICE  1 if leased parcel is planted in rice, 0 otherwise. 
COTTON  1 if leased parcel is planted in cotton, 0 otherwise. 
RISK  1 if landlord has a desire to share risk with tenant, 0 otherwise. 
AVOID  1 if landlord has a desire to avoid risk, 0 otherwise. 
TENRISK  1 if tenant has a desire to share risk with landlord, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
88% of their surveyed tenants were high school graduates but only 33% graduated 
from post-secondary institutions. 
 
Consistent with AELOS, responding landlords were not overly dependent on leasing 
income.3 For 56% of landlords, leasing income represented less than 25% of their 
total income, and only 21% of respondents indicated that leasing income  
represented over half of their income.4 Respondents leased out an average of 565 
acres with a range from 80 to 4,500 acres. 
                                                           
3 The Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey (USDA/1999b) reported that 68% of 
landlords derive less than 25% of their income from leasing income. R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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Table 2:  Summary statistics of model variables, Arkansas landlord survey, 1998. 
  Full Sample Statistics    Sub-sample Means 







            
CONTRACT  1.38  0  2  0  1  2 
RENT -  20  112    50.08  -  - 
CROPCROP -  3  50   - 25.05 - 
CROPCOST -  13  50   -  - 29.70 
COSTCOST -  3.23 50   -  - 14.61 
Explanatory 
Variables 
            
EQUITY  0.16  0  0.89  0.27 0.20 0.11 
VALUE 3.14  1 5    3.04  3.15  3.16 
START 0.52  0  1    0.33  0.53  0.56 
YEARS 10.39  0 58    6.33  8.64  12.68 
INCOME 1.76 1  4    1.50  1.82  1.79 
IRRIGATE 0.84  0  1    0.75  0.87  0.84 
QUALITY 27.93  28.14  33.78    26.79  28.00  28.25 
SUPPLY  423.47 47.49  913.21  483.72  430.68  403.60 
VARIANCE 12.12  4.73  22.89  14.77  12.24 11.52 
OUTLAY  0.08  0  1  0 0.08  0.10 
KNOW 1.57  1  3    1.58  1.45  1.66 
DENSITY 58.11  14.69  465.66    69.50  53.84  58.57 
ACRES 564.84  80  4500    497.08  580.85  569.10 
RELATIVE 1.69  0  3    1.58  1.72 1.69 
LLAGE 64  34  93    64  65  63 
TENAGE 47  23 80    46  47  46 
BILL 1.95  1  3    2.04  1.93  1.94 
RICE 0.37  0  1    0.13  0.41  0.39 
COTTON 0.15 0  1    0.13  0.17  0.13 
RISK  0.31  0  1  0 0.16  0.49 
AVOID 0.17  0  1    0.54  0.21  0.05 
TENRISK 0.17 0  1   0.04  0.12  0.24 
 
 
Conceptual Model and Testable Implications 
 
Landlords and tenants in our sample chose among the following contract types: cash 
rent, crop-share, and cost-share. A cash rent contract requires the tenant to pay the 
landowner a fixed annual cash payment and be responsible for all operating 
expenses, but the tenant receives all income from production and government 
payments. In a crop-share contract the tenant is responsible for all operating 
expenses but shares the production output, i.e. crop, and government payments 
with the landlord. A cost-share contract not only includes a sharing of the output 
                                                           
4 Bierlen et al. (2000a) report that 71.2% of tenants relied on farming income for 50% or more of total 
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and government payments between tenant and landlord but also – unlike the crop-
share contract – a sharing of the operating expenses.  
 
The type of contract chosen affects the level of tenant cash outlays. In a cash rent 
contract the tenant must pay the cash rent in addition to the full normal operating 
expenses. With a crop-share lease, expenses are similar to those of a cash rent lease, 
less the cash rent. In a cost-share lease, the tenant pays no cash rent and only a 
share of certain specified operating expenses – normally the same share as he/she 
receives of the crop. Since landlord income is dependent on variable crop yields and 
market prices with share contracts, additional financial and managerial 
compensation is typically negotiated to induce landlords to utilize these contracts. 
 
The credit constraint paradigm is used to initially specify the model for selecting 
lease type. It adheres to the belief that producers use leasing arrangements as a 
substitute for debt (BPD and Bierlen et al., 2000b). This framework assumes 
tenants surmount credit constraints and increase the scale of operation by moving 
from a cost-share to a crop-share to a cash rent contract. This approach says that 
the probability of choosing a cost-share (cash rent) contract should increase 
(decrease) with operating expenses, cash rent levels, and landlord financial 
strength. The framework also implies that tenants with strong financial conditions 
will choose cash rent contracts because per acre tenant profits are typically highest 
with a cash rent contract (BPD). This study tests the credit constraint framework 
by using variables that indicate the levels of operating expenses, cash rent, and 
tenant and landlord financial strengths as described below.5  
 
Variables impacting operating expenses and cash rent levels include land quality 
and availability of contracted land. First, characteristics increasing the quality of 
the land are hypothesized to increase the probability of a cost-share contract. Soil 
fertility (QUALITY) and irrigation (IRRIGATE) enhance the land’s productive 
value. These two variables increase operating expenses and cash rent levels by 
encouraging higher input usage and being relatively more desirable resources to 
manage. Also, per acre cash rent levels are directly affected by the supply and 
demand of cropland acreage. High per acre rent levels are associated with a small 
supply of available contract acres. Therefore, leased cropland acreage per operator 
in a county (SUPPLY) is hypothesized to be negatively related to the probability of 
selecting a cost-share contract. 
 
Financial indicators reflect (1) landlords’ ability to provide operating capital and (2) 
tenants’ credit constraints. As noted in BPD, tenants with higher equity 
(owned/total operated acres) levels in their operations should be more financially 
stable than tenants with lower levels of ownership. The probability of choosing a 
                                                           
5 The survey instrument only queried landlords; therefore tenant information is based solely on 
landlord perceptions. R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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cost-share contract should decrease as tenant equity (EQUITY) increases. Similarly 
for landlords, the total value of their owned cropland acreage (VALUE) should 
indicate their financial strength. Therefore, VALUE is hypothesized to increase the 
probability of choosing a cost-share contract. Another variable indicating landlord 
financial strength is their percentage of total income derived from leasing 
(INCOME). This implies that the probability of selecting a cost-share contract 
decreases as INCOME increases. Relatively speaking, landlords with highly valued 
cropland acreage and significant non-farm income should have a superior financial 
condition and are more able to assume the added risk and increased expenses 
associated with a cost-share contract. Landlords who inherited all or part of their 
cropland should face reduced debt payment obligations compared with landlords 
who purchased their acreage. The landlords who purchased their acreage would 
likely require a higher return for their acquired resources. This suggests that 
landlords who purchased their land (START) are more likely to prefer cost-share 
contracts.  
 
Following BPD we hypothesize that tenants with a weak financial position continue 
to secure leased parcels for relatively longer periods of time. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that the probability of selecting a cost-share contract increases as the 
length of the leasing period (YEARS) increases. Similarly, we test if tenants 
attempting to reduce cash operating expenses during lease negotiations (OUTLAY) 
are more likely to utilize cost sharing arrangements. Lastly, crop yield variability 
measured by the county-level coefficient of variation for the crop raised 
(VARIANCE) is used as a proxy for risk aversion. Increasing crop variance is 
assumed to increase the probability of selecting a cash rent contract by risk averse 
landlords.   
 
Ordered Probit Analysis of Contract Choice Hypotheses 
 
The estimation and statistical testing utilize McFadden’s (1981) ordered probit 
(discrete dependent variable) models to test hypotheses about cropland contract 
decision-making. The dependent variable numerical values indicate an ordinal 
ranking of the outcomes, with higher values indicating a more preferred or desired 
outcome than lower values. The underlying model of binomial or ordinally ranked 
estimation assumes that the true value of the dependent variable (y*i) is 
unobservable. The process generating the unobserved values of (y*i) is: 
 
y*i = β′xi + εi, 
 
where y*i represents the unobserved value; xi is a vector of explanatory variables on 
the ith observation; and εi the error term (normally distributed with mean zero and 
unit variance). The observable yi is defined as follows for the ordered probit model: 
 
If y* i ≤ 0, then yi = 0; R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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      If 0 < y*i ≤ λ, then yi = 1; 
If λ < y*i , then yi = 2. 
 
For the ordered probit model, λ is an unknown “threshold” parameter to be 
estimated along with β.  
 
Models are estimated using maximum likelihood methods. The probability of a 
given discrete outcome is a function of β′xi. The components of β do not have the 
classical regression model interpretation of the marginal change in the dependent 
variable as the levels of xi change (Greene, 2000). Unlike the classical regression 
model, the marginal change in probabilities is a function of xi as well as β. In the 
general case, the signs of the coefficients only indicate direction of changes in the 
highest and lowest ranked categories of yi for changes in xi but not for the interior 
category. That is, if a component of β is greater than zero, then an increase in the 
corresponding xi means that the probability that y = 0 decreases and the probability 
that y = 2 increases. 
 
Credit Constraint Model Results and Interpretation 
 
Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates for the credit constraint model (column 1) 
with the asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses.6 The estimate of λ is 
positive and significant. Variables significantly impacting contract selection in the 
credit constraint model at least the .1 level are EQUITY, VALUE, YEARS, and 
VARIANCE. 
 
The coefficients of the variables representing landlord and tenant financial 
strengths give contradictory findings. As anticipated, increasing tenant financial 
strength, EQUITY, makes cash rent contracts more likely. This finding is consistent 
with the results reported in BPD. But contrary to the hypothesized outcome, 
strengthening the landlord’s financial condition, VALUE, also makes cash rent 
contracts more likely. Tenant financial condition is the more statistically significant 
variable. The significance of EQUITY shows that credit constraints are an 
important factor and supports the idea that tenants with higher equity have 
influence in the contracting process. Furthermore, the significance and positive sign 
of YEARS indicates longer term leases are associated with cost-share leases. In 
addition to helping tenants with weak financials, social closeness might also grow 
out of cost-share arrangements leading farm operators to continue to cost-share. 
The coefficient of VARIANCE, as hypothesized, indicates that increasing the 
variability of the cropland’s yield makes cash rent contracts more likely. The  
                                                           
6 On the basis of condition indices as in Belsley, Kuh and Welch (1981), multicollinearity is only a 
problem in the agency model and none of the other six models estimated in the study. Since the 
agency model is clearly inferior as indicated by the Davidson-McKinnon tests, no attempt is made to 
ameliorate the problem. R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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Table 3: Estimated Ordered Probit Coefficients for Landlord Contract Choice Models. 
Explanatory 
Variable 
1:  Credit 
Constraint Model 
2:  Agency Problem 
Model 
3: Risk Aversion 
Model 




































VARIANCE  -0.0514* 
(0.0274) 
  
OUTLAY  -0.2965 
(0.4827) 
  
KNOW   0.2681 
(0.1703) 
 
DENSITY   0.0006 
(0.0011) 
 
ACRES   -0.82E-05 
(0.0001) 
 
RELATIVE   -0.0213 
(0.1118) 
 
LLAGE   -0.0066 
(0.0091) 
 
TENAGE   0.0065 
(0.0098) 
 
BILL   -0.1006 
(0.1625) 
 
RICE     0.3022 
(0.3303) 
COTTON     -0.6290 
(0.4014) 
RISK     1.4679*** 
(0.4724) 
AVOID     -0.8169** 
(0.3514) 
TENRISK     -0.3053 
(0.4497) 






Obs.  107 174  114 
Davidson-McKinnon Tests of Non-nested Hypotheses Tests 
H0: 1 true model 
H1: 2 true model  χ2 = 13.92* 
  
H0: 1 true model 
H1: 3 true model  χ2 = 24.67***    
H0: 2 true model 
H1: 1 true model 
  χ2 = 179.06***   
H0: 2 true model 
H1: 3 true model 
  χ2 = 198.80***   
H0: 3 true model 
H1: 1 true model 
   χ2 = 8.48** 
H0: 3 true model 
H1: 2 true model 
  χ2 = 17.47** 
       ***Significant at the 0.01 level.    **Significant at the 0.05 level. R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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       *Significant at the 0.10 level.    Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
coefficient, although weakly significant, is consistent with a risk aversion 
framework that suggests landlords attempt to limit their exposure to risky returns. 
Thus farm operators willing to accept risk can pursue the potentially higher returns 
from cash rent leases. 
 
Alternative Model: Agency Problem 
 
Following the specification in BPD, an alternative model emphasizing agency 
theory is estimated.  With this approach, each lease presents unique opportunities 
for morally hazardous behavior, i.e. the tenant may take advantage of the landlord 
without detection.  Examples of the agency problem include: 1) inputs are not set at 
levels which maximize joint tenant/landlord net returns for crop-share contracts, 2) 
incentives are present in share contracts which encourage tenants to underreport 
production levels, 3) cost-share contracts can lead to diversion of landlord supplied 
inputs to other enterprises, and 4) landlord supplied inputs like irrigation or soil 
fertility can be over-exploited in cash rent contracts. Two groups of variables are 
utilized to test the agency problem hypothesis: one group of “asset specific” 
variables quantifies the productive characteristics of the cropland acreage, and the 
other group describes the experience, managerial abilities and profit motives of the 
tenants and landlords. 
 
Variables identifying asset characteristics include irrigation equipment, alternative 
productive uses for the acreage, and size of the leased parcel. The presence of 
irrigation (IRRIGATE) diminishes the option for tenants to deplete soil moisture. 
On the other hand, irrigation creates an incentive to “over-farm” the land. Therefore 
the sign of IRRIGATE is uncertain. Increasing population density, DENSITY, – 
which proxies for alternative uses of cropland – should increase the likelihood of a 
cash rent contract being utilized. This result follows since landowners should be less 
concerned with annual returns from the land when alternative uses for cropland are 
comparatively more profitable. The alternative uses make tenant misuse of 
cropland less important. It also gives the landowner other options to generate 
returns from their land, thereby increasing the landlord’s bargaining position. 
ACRES is assumed to increase the probability of selecting a cost-share contract 
because opportunities for undetected abuse or misuse of resources increase with 
lease size.  
 
To investigate possible effects of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform 
(FAIR) Act of 1996 and the production flexibility contract payment issue, landlord 
perceptions of who benefits most from the legislation (BILL) are included as an 
explanatory variable. Schertz and Johnston (1997) find some evidence that lease 
terms were renegotiated as a result of the FAIR Act. In our survey only 7% of the 
leases experienced changes in rent and/or share levels between 1995 and 1998. 
Landlords with share leases benefit from the FAIR Act since they receive a R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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proportion of the production flexibility contract equal to their share of the crop. On 
the other hand, landlords with cash leases could attempt to capture part of the 
payment by raising rents. Thus it is not possible to sign the coefficient of BILL on a 
priori grounds. 
 
Income is included in the agency problem model to control for the risk perceptions of 
the landlords.  The variable INCOME is expected to be negatively related to the 
probability of choosing a cost-share contract due to lessor risk aversion.7 This 
results from the belief that landlords are thought to want to reduce the variability 
of their farm income as the importance of their leasing income increases. 
 
Tenant/landlord experience and managerial ability also have an impact on the 
operating expenses and cash rent levels. Tenants with relatively better production 
backgrounds are thought to be better managers and are able to negotiate better 
contract terms, thereby reducing contract costs and increasing tenant profits. This 
also holds true for landowners because experienced landlords are more able to 
vigorously pursue profit opportunities with their resources. KNOW represents the 
landlord’s opinion of whether the landlord has superior agricultural price and 
production knowledge relative to his/her tenant. Better landlord knowledge should 
increase the probability of selecting a cost-share contract. Landlords possessing this 
production expertise will more likely prefer relatively more involvement in 
production decisions, utilizing their knowledge to generate a return. Age is used for 
both the landlord and tenant to measure their relative experience levels. Increasing 
tenant experience (TENAGE) should decrease the likelihood of cost-share contracts, 
while increasing landlord experience (LLAGE) makes cost sharing arrangements 
more likely. 
 
Lastly, the effect of the social relationship between the contracting agents is 
examined. It is expected that agents with close social relationships (RELATIVE) 
negotiate mutually favorable contract terms and these terms should be more easily 
enforced (Otsuka and Hayami, 1988). Among close relations there should be less 
information asymmetry and likely less inclination to cheat. This implies that 
RELATIVE is positively related to the probability of choosing a cost-share contract. 
 
The estimated coefficients of the agency problem model are presented in Table 3 
(column 2). None of the included variables are significant. This result differs 
substantially from results reported for BPD’s agency model. The insignificant 
results are likely due, at least partially, to high levels of collinearity. As discussed 




                                                           
7 The risk aversion hypothesis is specifically tested in model 3. R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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Alternative Model: Risk Aversion 
 
Following BPD, an additional model is estimated that explores risk aversion as a 
means of explaining landlord lease type selection. For this framework, the risk 
characterizations have typically been that the landowner is risk-neutral and the 
tenant is risk-averse, although in this study both landlords and tenants can be risk-
averse. The estimated model examines how differing risk perceptions by both 
landlord and tenant affect contract type selection. Unlike risk averse tenants 
preferring share arrangements, increasing risk could cause risk averse landlords to 
prefer cash rent contracts. Thus, the likelihood of share contracts being utilized 
increases (decreases) as the tenant’s (landlord’s) risk-aversion increases.  
 
Land quality (QUALITY and IRRIGATE) should lower risk for both parties, so their 
signs are indeterminate.  A crop with a higher yield or business risk is more likely 
to operate under a crop sharing arrangement. Rice and cotton production require 
intensive management and specialized equipment, thus increasing operating 
expenses. Therefore, RICE and COTTON are thought to increase the probability of 
a cost-share contract. Similarly to the credit constraint hypothesis, variables 
representing operating expenses, cash rent levels, and tenant/landlord managerial 
ability and financial condition are indicators of risk or capacity to cope with risk. 
Therefore, these variables are included in the model. Variables indicating landlord 
financial strength and profit motives (VALUE, START, and YEARS) indicate some 
tolerance for risk and should increase the probability of a cost-share contract. For 
similar reasons, INCOME is expected to increase the probability of a cash rent 
contract. Landlords dependent on a relatively higher proportion of income from 
leasing would more likely want to reduce the variability of lease income if they are 
risk averse. Tenant financial risk should decrease as his/her financial condition 
strengthens. Therefore, EQUITY should increase the likelihood of a cash rent 
contract to maximize tenant returns. To assess the effect of the local supply of 
cropland as in the credit constraint model, leased cropland acreage per operator in a 
county (SUPPLY) is included in the risk aversion model. It should be negatively 
related to the probability of selecting a cost-share contract.  
 
Since the risk aversion model examines the role of risk perceptions and preferences 
on the contracting process, three variables (RISK, AVOID, and TENRISK) that 
gauge landlord/tenant risk motives are included in the model. Landlords and 
tenants having a desire to share risk (RISK and TENRISK) are more likely to 
utilize cost sharing contracts. Landlords wanting to avoid risk (AVOID) are more 
likely to utilize cash rent contracts.  
 
The estimated coefficients of the risk aversion model are presented in Table 3 
(column 3). The results indicate that EQUITY, VALUE, START, YEARS, 
QUALITY, RISK and AVOID significantly affect cropland contract selection. The 
financial indicator variables⎯EQUITY, VALUE, START and YEARS⎯ indicate R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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that landlord and tenant financial conditions influence which contract type is 
selected. The estimated coefficient of YEARS indicates that as the contracting 
relationship lengthens, cost-share contracts become more likely. The result provides 
support for both the credit constraint and risk aversion models. Similar to the 
results of the credit constraint model, the sign of the VALUE coefficient is different 
from the anticipated sign and indicates that as the landlord’s cropland value 
increases, cash rent arrangements are more likely.  
 
While the tenant risk variable is insignificant, the landlord risk perception 
variables, RISK and AVOID, are significant and have the expected signs. Landlords 
wanting to share risk utilize crop-sharing arrangements, while landlords who want 
to avoid risk select cash rent contracts. These results are consistent with the risk 
aversion theory and suggest that landlord risk preferences play an important role in 
the contracting process. Thus tenants who have some knowledge of the landlord risk 
preferences might be able to choose their lease types by choosing landlords with risk 
preferences consistent with the lease type they want. Tenants/landlords desiring a 
specific lease should partner with counterparts likely to prefer that lease type. 
 
Davidson-MacKinnon tests (Greene) are used to test among the three different 
competing hypotheses. As in BPD, the purpose of these tests is to determine if one 
of the models is statistically superior to the others. The tests essentially use the 
encompassing principle. The evidence against the agency model suggests it can be 
rejected at the 0.01 level. The evidence between the credit constraint and the risk 
aversion models is not as clear. Both models reject in favor of the other, although 
the risk aversion rejects the credit constraint with a higher p-value than credit 
constraint rejects risk aversion. 
 
Analysis of Contract Term Regressions 
 
This section specifies and presents regression models of the terms of cropland 
contracts. Regression models are estimated and presented in Table 4 that explain 
the percentage share of crop in crop-share contracts, and the percentage share of 
the crop and costs in cost-share contracts. Because of an insufficient number of cash 
rent observations, estimation of a rent level equation was not possible. Landlord 
crop-share and cost-share proportions are hypothesized to be functions of land 
characteristics, landlord/tenant characteristics, landlord/tenant social capital, type 
of crop grown on acreage, and the available supply of cropland. 
 
Land characteristics include: QUALITY, IRRIGATE, ACRES and DENSITY. 
QUALITY and IRRIGATE increase the land’s productivity and imply a higher 
valued asset to control. Therefore, both variables are believed to increase landlord 
crop-shares and decrease landlord cost-shares. Barry et al. (2000) find that soil 
productivity is a significant variable in leasing price equations for Illinois cropland. 
Larger land tracts may be more desirable because of operating convenience and  R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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Table 4:  Estimated Coefficients for Regression Equations of Landlord Contract Terms 
Independent  CROPCROP CROPCOST COSTCOST 














































































F-statistic 2.08** 1.20  1.33 
ADJ R2 0.2451  0.0419  0.0656 
Obs.  41 57 57 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Note: Initially the regression models were estimated including the inverse Mill’s ratio 
from the risk aversion model to account for possible selection bias as in BPD.  Since the 
inverse Mills ratio coefficients from the risk aversion model were all insignificant, 
selection bias was judged not to be a problem and the models were estimated by least 




economies of scale. However, larger tracts of land require tenants capable of 
financing larger operations, implying the pool of tenants bidding on land decreases 
as ACRES increases. Therefore, the sign of ACRES is unclear a priori. DENSITY 
should strengthen the landlord’s bargaining position, thereby increasing landlord 
crop-share percentages.  
 
Landlord and tenant characteristics describe the management and bargaining 
expertise of the contracting agents. KNOW indicates the landlords’ relative R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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agricultural knowledge. Landlords possessing a strong knowledge of agricultural 
production, management and marketing practices are in a better bargaining 
position to negotiate contracts because of reduced information asymmetry. This 
should allow them to obtain higher crop-shares and lower cost-shares. Tenants with 
a strong financial condition (EQUITY) are less dependent on leasing, allowing them 
to negotiate from a position of strength resulting in lower landlord crop-share and 
higher landlord cost-share percentages. 
 
The social closeness of the contracting agents has been found to influence the terms 
of the negotiated contracts (Gwilliam, 1993). RELATIVE and YEARS indicate the 
level of social capital and the information asymmetry between the agents. The 
impact of social capital is difficult to predict a priori given that BPD found mixed 
results over the various contract types. To the extent social capital reflects 
landlords who are older relatives of tenants, lower landlord crop shares and higher 
cost shares would be expected as social closeness increases.  
 
Yield variability, type of crop grown, and availability of cropland acreage likely 
affect share levels. Relatively more risky crops require additional tenant financial 
inducements. Therefore, higher VARIANCE levels should result in lower landlord 
crop-share levels. COTTON and RICE are included to examine specific crop effects 
on contract terms. The impact of these crops on lease terms is uncertain a priori. 
Both crops are highly valued thus inducing higher landlord crop shares to capture 
higher returns. But both crops are management intensive and require specialized 
equipment, indicating that tenants may need financial inducements to contract. 
This idea is more compelling with cotton where operating expenses are typically 
higher than for either rice or soybeans, and landlords sometime require cotton 
production on the acreage. A larger supply of available cropland acreage, SUPPLY, 
increases tenant bargaining power. This bargaining power results in lower landlord 
crop-share and higher cost-share percentages. 
 
The estimated parameters for the crop-share model (CROPCROP) are listed in the 
first column of Table 4. Land and crop characteristics are significant determinants 
of crop-share percentages. IRRIGATE, VARIANCE and COTTON are all significant 
at the 0.01 level. The positive and significant sign on IRRIGATE suggests, as 
hypothesized, irrigated acreage contracts at a premium. While VARIANCE is 
significant, it does not have the anticipated sign. The coefficient indicates that as 
the variance increases, so does the landlord’s share percentage. Landlords 
apparently extract additional compensation for accepting more risk. The crop 
variable COTTON is significant indicating, as in BPD, that crop characteristics 
influence contract terms. Cotton is a management intensive crop and the negative 
sign for COTTON indicates a discount reflecting a favorable bargaining position for 
tenants possessing the production expertise and equipment needed to produce 
cotton. It may also reflect that certain landlords may be willing to accept a lower  
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share of the crop if they are able to make returns from other aspects of cotton 
production, e.g., ginning.  
 
The estimated parameters for the crop-share percentages on the cost-share 
contracts model (CROPCOST) are listed in the second column of Table 4. Land 
quality and population density are significant in explaining crop-share levels for 
cost-share contracts. The positive and significant sign on QUALITY indicates that 
more productive land, i.e. better yields, contracts at a premium. The negative sign 
on DENSITY indicates that landlords who might be holding land for conversion to a 
non-agricultural use are less demanding in negotiations. In contrast, BPD found six 
variables significant at the 0.10 level or better in their tenant CROPCOST model, 
particularly with respect to crop types. 
 
The estimated coefficients for the percent of cost shared in cost-sharing contracts 
model (COSTCOST) are listed in the third column of Table 4. The coefficients show 
that land quality, density, and the length of the leasing relationship are the 
significant variables in explaining cost-share arrangements. The positive QUALITY 
coefficient implies landlords leasing higher quality land pay more of the costs but, 
as is clear in the crop-share level for cost-share contracts, lessors are also 
compensated by taking a larger share of the crop. Thus landlords are willing to 
extend their risk exposure on higher quality land. The results on QUALITY agree 
with the findings of BPD. They found that quality land resulted in landlords paying 
about one and a half percentage points more of production costs and taking about 
one and a half percent more of the crop per unit increase in QUALITY. As with 
crop-shares on the cost-share contracts, BPD found crop effects to be significant in 
explaining the cost-shares of the contract, which we do not.  
 
Consistent with the CROPCOST model, the coefficient on DENSITY is negative and 
significant in the COSTCOST model. The DENSITY result for the cost-sharing 
models implies that these landlords negotiate lower cost-sharing percentages for 
their contracts consistent with lower crop sharing. Increasing the length of the 
contracting relationship, YEARS, increases the percent of costs landlords pay. This 
result indicates that tenants gain more favorable terms as information asymmetries 
are diminished. It should be noted that the explanatory power of the CROPCOST 
and COSTCOST models is low. Thus while some of the variables are statistically 




This study identified factors affecting landlord selection of cropland contract types 
and the terms thereof. Utilizing 1998 data from Arkansas cropland landlords, three 
leasing theories were examined. Ordered probit models were estimated to test credit 
constraints, agency problem and risk aversion hypotheses in selection of cropland 
contracts. In addition to the probit models, regression equations were estimated to R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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identify variables affecting the level of crop-share and cost-share percentages for 
cropland contracts. 
 
In the credit constraints model, tenant financial strength, value of landlord’s 
cropland holdings, length of the contracting relationship, and yield variability of the 
leased land significantly affected cropland contract selection. Tenant equity and 
length of the contracting relationship additionally provide support for the credit 
constraint framework. Landlords display risk aversion by preferring cash rent to 
share leases as yield variability increases.  
 
There was little support found for the agency problem model. None of the variables 
in that model were significant, indicating that perhaps an alternative specification 
is needed to examine agency problems from the landlord’s perspective.  
 
Similarly to the credit constraint model, the risk aversion model supports both the 
credit constraint and risk aversion explanations. The significance of landlord risk 
preferences provides strong support for landlord risk aversion, while the tenant risk 
preferences variable was insignificant. Neither the credit constraint nor risk 
aversion models were rejected in favor of the other. Therefore, credit constraints 
and landlord risk aversion should be considered as viable land-leasing models. 
 
The regression equation examining crop-share contract terms reveals that land and 
crop characteristics were important determinants of crop-share percentages for 
crop-share contracts. As expected, irrigated acreage contracted at a premium. Also, 
there was a significant difference in crop-share levels due to crop type with cotton 
being significantly lower than soybeans. For the crop-share and cost-share 
percentages of the cost-share contract, land quality and potential alternative uses of 
the land were significant. The effect of land quality was similar to results found in a 
previous tenants’ survey.  Social capital was not significant in any of the three 
contract terms equations in contrast to the earlier tenant study.  However, as the 
length of the landlord/tenant relationship increased, the tenant’s share of costs for a 
cost-share contract decreased. This presents some support for social capital since 
social closeness presumably increases with longevity of the lease and decreases the 
costs associated with asymmetric information. 
 
Land is an input to farm operators and an asset to landlords. The study results 
indicate that the factors motivating the two involved parties differ, primarily for 
lease type selection. This provides opportunities for both parties. The lease type 
selected is a function not only of the land characteristics, but also of the 
characteristics of the two parties involved in the negotiation. This suggests that an 
operator has an incentive to seek landlords who are more inclined, due to varying 
risk preferences or financial situations, to agree to lease types that are compatible 
to the tenant’s preferences than landlords with conflicting preferences. For example, 
some landlords appear willing to share risk with tenants in exchange for a contract R. Rainey, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 1, 2005 
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type that may have a higher return, i.e., crop-share. Tenants with low risk-carrying 
capacity or preferences should try to identify such landlords with compatible 
preferences.  Clearly, landlords have similar incentives with respect to tenants. The 
results also indicate that farm management firms should be aware of the risk 
preferences and financial situations of landlords and prospective tenants when 
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